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Abstract
Blind signature scheme is based on public key cryptosystem. Public-key cryptosystem is
widely used these days for various security purposes. The use of public key cryptosystems
received huge amount of attention. They are beneficial in encipherment, authentication,
non-repudiation as well as digital signature, which plays an essential role in electronic
banking and financial transactions. This project has proposed a new blind signature
scheme based on ElGamal signature scheme. Blind signature schemes, first introduced
by David Chaum, allows a person to get a message signed by another party without
revealing any information about the message to the other party. It is an extension
of digital signature which can be implements using a number of common public key
signing schemes, for instance RSA and ElGamal signature scheme. Blind signature is
typically employed in privacy related protocols, where the signer and the requester are
different person. In our project work we have taken an existing scheme based on ElGamal
signature scheme as the reference scheme for comparison and proposed a new scheme.
Aims of the proposed scheme is high security features and reduce the communication
overhead, computation overhead, signature length. The proposed scheme aims to have
lesser computation overhead and high security features than existing scheme [1, 2, 3, 5,
15, 16 ].
Keywords : Blind signature, digital signature, public key-cryptosystem, communica-
tion overhead, computation overhead.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
These days public key cryptosystem are widely used for secure network communi-
cation. It has received well known attention. Along with authenticity it provides
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation. Public key cryptosystem is very reliable
for communication industry, financial transaction, electronic mail , e-commerce
and internet. They are beneficial in encryption as well as digital signing which
plays an essential role in electronic money transactions and identity verification [1,
15 ,16, 17]. In this project we have proposed a Blind Signature scheme based on
ElGamal scheme and implemented the proposed scheme. We have compared the
outcomes of proposed scheme with an existing scheme describe in Chapter 2.4.
1.1 Digital Signature
A digital signature verifies the authenticity of an electronic document or digital
message. Digital signatures are commonly used to identify electronic entities for
online transactions. A valid digital signature gives a user reason to believe that the
message was created by a known legitimate sender, such that the sender cannot
deny having sent the message and that the message was not altered in transit. A
digital signature uniquely identifies the originator of digitally signed data and also
ensures the integrity of the signed data against tampering or corruption. Digital
signatures are commonly used for software distribution, Authenticate online enti-
ties, Verify the origin of digital data. Ensure the integrity of digital data against
tampering, financial transactions, and in other cases where it is important to de-
tect forgery attack. A digital signature procedure is shown in Figure 1.1 [5, 13,
14].
1
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Figure 1.1: Creating a digital signature
1.1.1 Authentication
A message source is authenticate by digital signature. A valid signature shows
that the message was sent by that user, where user is the requester. Authenticity
in digital signature means that the message or the user is valid [5, 13, 14].
1.1.2 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is an important feature of digital signature. By this property, an
entity that has signed some information cannot at a later time deny having signed
it [5, 13, 14].
1.1.3 Attacks on Digital Signature
This section describes attack on digital signature. Key-Only attack, Known mes-
sage attack and Chosen-Message attack are some attacks on DS. If the attack is
successful, the result is a forgery. We can have two types of forgery [20, 21, 22].
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1.1.4 Forgery
In a cryptographic digital signature system, digital signature forgery is the ability
to create a pair consisting of a message and a signature that is valid for message,
and message has not been signed by the legitimate signer [9]. Existential and
Selective are the two types of forgery.
• Existential Forgery
In an existential forgery the attacker is able to create a valid signature-
message pair, but the attacker cannot use this pair really. This type of
forgery is probable, but the attacker cannot benefit from it [20, 21, 22].
• Selective Forgery
In the selective forgery, the attacker is able to forge signers signature on a
message. The attacker gets benefit from this forge unlike existential forgery.
The probability of such forge is low [20, 21, 22].
1.2 Blind Signature
Blind signature is an extension of digital signature in which a message is signed
by a signer without knowing the content of the message. Blind signature was first
introduced by David Chaum in 1983. It allows a person to get a message signed by
another party without revealing any information about the message to the other
party [2, 3, 4].
Sometimes we have a document that need to get signed without revealing the con-
tents of the document to the signer. For example, a scientist, say Bob, might have
discovered a very important theory that need to be signed by a public, say Alice,
without allowing Alice to know the content of the document. Blind Signature
protocol for this purpose works as follows [20]:
• Bob creates a message and blinds it. Bob sends the blinded message to Alice
• Alice signs the blinded message and send the signature on the blinded mes-
sage
• Bob unblinds the signature to obtain a signature on the original message.
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Basic security features of a standard blind signature are un-linkability, blindness
and non-repudiation [20, 21].Lets see a block diagram of blind signature protocol
see Figure 1.2. It consist of two participants a requester and a signer where,
requester wants signer to sign a message m.Requester blind the message m with
some blinding factor b. Signer sign the blind message, where d is signers private
key. Requester un-blind the message and get the sign(m , d) which is signers
signature on m [2, 3].
Figure 1.2: Blind Signature Protocol
1.3 Public-key Cryptosystem
Public key cryptosystem requires two separate key, one of which is secret and
another is public. It is also called as asymmetric key cryptosystem. One key is
used for encryption and another is used for decryption. Neither key can perform
both operations by itself. The public key may be published without compromising
security, while the private key must not be revealed to anyone not authorized
to read the messages [15, 16, 17]. In the public key cryptosystem, the receivers
public key is used for encrypting the senders message. This public key is known to
everyone. The encrypted message is sent to the receiver, who will decrypt (unlock)
the message by his private key. Only the receiver can unlock the encrypted message
because no one else has the private key. Algorithm for encryption and decryption
is same see Figure 1.3 [15, 16, 17].
1.4 Security Goals
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are the prime security goals of the Blind
Signature scheme. These security goals have different specification in respect of
security. Describe in the below section [20].
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Figure 1.3: Public-key Cryptosystem
1.4.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality means we need to protect our information. It is the most common
property of data security. It is not only applies to the storage information, it also
apply to the transmission of data. When we send a information or when we receive
a information, we need to conceal it during transmission.
1.4.2 Integrity
Integrity means that the changes need to be done by legitimate authorized entity
and through authorized mechanism. Integrity ensures that message should not
be change during processing. Information needs to be changed constantly. In-
tegrity violation is not necessarily the result of a malicious act. Document and
Fingerprint, Message and Message Digest, Checking Integrity, Cryptographic Hash
Function are some ways to maintain integrity [5, 13, 14, 20].
1.4.3 Availability
The last prime component of data security is Availability. The information need
to be available for legitimate authority. The unavailability of information is result
in same harmful as lack of confidentiality or integrity [20].
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1.5 Security Mechanism
Encipherment, Data integrity, Access control, Digital signature, Authentication
exchange are some mechanism to provide security [20].
1.6 Problem Statement
In literature all blind scheme have high communicational and computational over-
head. There is a need to develop Blind signature scheme with high security fea-
ture and low communicational, computational overhead. Also the signature length
must be low. Our objective is to design a BS scheme such that it should have high
security features, lesser computational overhead, lessr communicational overhead
and shorter signature length.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Mathematical Foundation
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman first introduced the concept of public key cryptosys-
tem. Their key distribution protocol is based on supposing that A and B want to
share a secret KAB where A has a secret xA and B has a secret xB . Let p be a
large prime and a be a primitive element mod p, which are both known to A and
B [5, 1].
A computes,
yA = a
xA (mod p)
And sends yA
yB = a
xB (mod p)
And sends yB
Then the secret KAB is computed as,
KAB = a
xAxB (mod p)
KAB = y
xA
B (mod p)
KAB = y
xB
A (mod p)
Therefore both A and B are able to compute KAB . But, for an intruder, comput-
ing appears to be difficult. The intruder will need to compute discrete logarithms
modulo a prime, which is known to be a difficult problem. In all cryptographic sys-
tems based on discrete logarithms, p must be chosen so that p -1 has at least one
large prime factor. If p -1 has only small prime factors, then computing discrete
logarithms is easy [1, 5].
7
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2.2 RSA Scheme
RSA cryptosystem is widely used to provide privacy. In RSA digital signature
scheme, first the private and public keys of the sender is used, second the sender
used her own private key to sign the document. The receiver uses the senders
public key to verify it. The signing and verifying sites use the same function, but
the parameters are different. The verifiers compares the message and the output
of the function for congruence. If the result is true, the message is accepted [20].
Assume a standard RSA setting in which the public key is denoted as a pair (e, n)
and the private key is denoted as a number d. Here the modulus n is a product of
two large (secret) primes p, q and the private key d is the multiplicative inverse of
e modulo (p-1)(q-1). For the security of the RSA system it is assumed that both
p and q are sufficiently large (e.g., 200 digit numbers) such that it is infeasible
to either find the factorization of n or to find the private key d, given only the
public key (e, n)[1]. Let a message m be given for which an RSA signature is
to be produced. m corresponds to an integer between 0 and n. The signature is
produced in one step by the signer.
Signing Phase
The signer use the private key d to compute the signature :-
S = md (mod n)
Anyone can verify that s is signature on the message m with respect to public
key (e,n) by performing the following step:
Verification Phase
Given a pair (m, s) the signature s is correct for message m if and only if the
equation:
m
′
= Se (mod n)
If m
′
= m then verified successfully
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2.3 ElGamal Scheme
EIGamal signature scheme was first introduced in 1985 and is described in this
section. In this signature scheme the public key is used for encryption and signa-
ture verification [1]. In the signing process, two functions create two signatures,
in the verifying process the output of the functions are compared. In the ElGamal
scheme same function is used for signing and verification, but it uses different in-
puts [20]. For each user, there is a key pair, which consists of a secret key x, and
a public key, y where:
y = ax (mod p)
The public key y is published in a public file and known to everybody while
the secret key x is kept secret. Let m be a document to be signed, where 0
≤ m ≤ p− 1 and p is a large prime. The public file consists of the public key y =
ax (mod p) for each user. To sign a document, a user A uses the secret key xA to
compute a signature for message m so that any user can verify that this message
has been signed by A, using the public key yA together with a and p. no one can
forge a signature without knowing the secret key xA. The signature for message
m is a pair (r, s), where 0 ≤ r, s ≤ p− 1, chosen such that :
am − yrrs (mod p) ............(1)
Signing Phase
The following three steps are done to compute the signature,
1. Choose a random number k, uniformly distributed between 0 and p - 1, such
that, gcd (k, p-1)=1
2. Compute,
r = ak (mod p)
3. Now (1) can be written as,
am = axraks (mod p)
which can be solved for s by using,
m = (xr + ks) mod (p− 1)
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Verification Phase
Given m, r and s, it is easy to verify the authenticity of the signature by computing
both side of (1) and checking that they are equal.
2.4 Review of Mohammed, Emarah and Shennawy
′
s scheme
A new blinding scheme is described in this section by E. Mohammed, A. E.
Emarah, Kh. El-Shennawy, it is based on ElGamal signature scheme. ElGamal
digital signature scheme shows randomness of k. Thus randomness assures that
if the same message is signed twice the two signatures generated will be different.
This is not possible in RSA. The mathematics of the new scheme will be explained
through the Following example. Suppose that Requester wants the Signer to sign
a message for her. The blinding procedure goes as follows [1]:-
Blinding Phase
Requester should Choose a random number k, uniformly between 1 and p - 1,
such that, Compute,
r = ak mod (p− 1)
Take a blinding factor h such that
gcd(k, p-1) = 1
Then compute,
m
′
= hm mod (p− 1)
Requester then send m
′
to Signer [1].
Signing Phase
The Signer receives m
′
from Requester and treats it as m any ordinary mes-
sage since the Signer does not recognize the blinding. The Signer computes s
′
from the relation,
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m
′
= (kx+ ks
′
) mod (p− 1)
s
′
= (m
′ − xr)k−1 mod (p− 1)
where s
′
is the blinded signature on m. The Signer send s
′
to Requester [1]
Un-blinding Phase
Requester should do the following to find the un-blinded signature s for m, ie
for h=1
s = xrk−1(h−1 − 1) + h−1s′ mod (p− 1)
Which is already computed by requester. Now the complete signature pair of
message m is (r,s) which are both known to requester but not known to signer [1].
Verifying Phase
Given m,r and s it is easy to verify the authenticity of the signature if,
am = yrrs mod (p− 1)
So, accept [1]
Chapter 3
Scope of the Work
Our scheme can be applicable in real life scenario, where digital document need
to be signed without disclosing its content. It is very useful for the application,
where security is the prime necessity such as e-cash, e-voting, e-commerce. The
proposed scheme has a wide range of scope in confidential transactions [2, 3].
3.1 E-voting
Blind signature is the most popular cryptographic technique in EVS by provid-
ing confidentiality of the voters vote. The signature is used to authenticate the
voter without disclosing the content of a vote. The authority is not able to know
whom a voter votes for [18]. In E-Voting, a vote is blinded in order to achieve
its confidentiality. To ensure the secrecy of the voters vote, a voter casts a ballot,
blinds a vote using a random number and sends it to the validator. The validator
then signs the blinded vote after verifying the voter. After receiving the validated
ballot, the voter un-blinds the ballot, to get the true signature, of the validator
for the vote see Figure 3.1 [18].
3.2 E-Cash
Setup Phase: The legitimate authority generates a public/private key pair for
a signature scheme. This key pair is used for verification of the details of the
scheme and the bank’s other public keys. The public key is widely published [19].
The bank generates a public/private key pair for a public-key encryption scheme.
12
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Figure 3.1: E-Voting System
The public key is widely published in a certificate signed using the legitimate au-
thority’s private key. The legitimate authority generates a series of public/private
key pairs for the blind signature scheme for each denomination of coin. These are
widely published in certificates signed using the legitimate authority’s private key
[19].
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Withdrawal Phase: The user prepares a coin, which is blank. This contains
information, in a predefined agreed format, for the identity of the bank, the de-
nomination of the coin and a randomly chosen serial number. The user undertakes
the blind signature protocol on the blank. The user also supply details of what
denomination the coin should have and make payment for the coin. The private
key is used to generate blind signature for denomination indicated by the user.
The coin have a blank and the signature on the blank [19].
Deposit-spend Phase: The user encrypts the coin (blank and the signature)
using the bank’s public encryption key. The merchant received the ciphertext.
The bank received the encrypted coin from the merchant. The bank decrypts it
and recovers the coin. The bank now ensures that the signature verifies using the
public key specified by the denomination of the coin by the blank. If not, the
bank rejects the coin and informs the merchant about this. Otherwise the bank
checks to see if the serial number of the coin exists. If so, the bank rejects the coin
and the merchant is informed about this. If the serial number isn’t valid, then
the serial number is added to the database and coin got accepted. The merchant
receive payment for coin [19].
3.3 E-Commerce
Often referred to as simply ecommerce, is used to describe business that is con-
ducted over the Internet using any of the applications that depends on the Internet.
Electronic commerce, an industry, where buying and selling of product or service
is conducted over electronic systems, such as the Internet and other computer net-
works. Electronic commerce is normally considered as e-business. It also consists
of the exchange of data to facilitate the financing and payment aspects of busi-
ness transactions. Modern electronic commerce typically uses the World Wide
Web [27]. It may encompass a wider range of technologies such as electronic-mail,
social media, mobile devices, and telephones as well. Mobile, electronic funds
transfer, supply chain management, Internet marketing, online transaction pro-
cessing, electronic data interchange (EDI), automated data collection systems are
the technologies used by electronic commerce [27].
Some common applications related to electronic commerce are the fol-
lowing:
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• Online Banking
• Electronic Ticket
• Document Automation
• Group Buying
• Online Shopping
• Teleconferencing
• Shopping Cart Software
Chapter 4
Proposed scheme
Proposed scheme emphasis on security. The overall computation overhead for the
proposed scheme is lesser than the existing scheme and it can be made more lesser
if we compromised with the security. This scheme consists of two participants
namely signer (A) and requester (B). The scheme consists of five phases, setup,
blinding, signing, un-blinding and verifying.
4.1 Setup Phase
Setup is a phase between a signer and requester in which signer and requester
generates their private, public key and system parameters. After generations of
keys they publish their public key. Setup phase starts from a P, which is a large
prime number, q is a prime factor of (p-1), g is a generator Zq*. The signer
chooses his private key xaZq∗ and publishes ya = gxa (mod P ). The requester
chooses his private key xbZq∗ and publishes his public key yb = gxb (mod P ).
4.2 Blinding Phase
In blinding phase, the signer computes by choosing K, β randomly in Zq* and
sends v to requester. The requester chooses l, K random and computes,
r = gK (mod P )
S = (K + rxA) (mod P )
16
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v = g−Sβ (mod P )
The requester sends the blinding message t
′
to signer,
µ = gl (mod P )
t
′
= h(m, (µl
−1xβ)(y
S−1xβ
β )vµg
−α) (mod P )
4.3 Signing Phase
After receiving t
′
, the signer generates signature as follows,
t = t
′
+ β
v
′
= tS
The Signer sends ( v
′
, t) to the requester.
4.4 Un-blinding Phase
The requester computes,
S
′
= l − v′
S
′′
= (S
′ − α) (mod q)
( S
′′
, t
′
, S) is the blinding signature on message m.
4.5 Verifying Phase
Any verifier having message m with signature pair ( S
′′
, t
′
, S) can verify as follows,
Compute
t
′′
= h(m, yβ, g
S(1+t′), gS
′′
) mod p
Check if t
′′
= t
′
If so accepts.
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4.6 Correctness
This is the prove of the verification of the proposed scheme.
t
′
= h(m, (µl
−1xβ)(y
S−1xβ
β )vµg
−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, (gl.l
−1xβ)(gxβ)Sx
−1
β .g−Sβ.gl.g−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, gxβ .gS.g−Sβ.gl.g−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S.g−Sβ.gS
′+tS.g−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S.g−Sβ+S
′+tS.g−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S.g−Sβ+S
′+(t′+β)S.g−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S.g−Sβ+S
′+t′S+βS.g−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S+S′+t′S−α) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
(S−α)+S(1+t′) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S′′+S(1+t′) mod P
t
′
= h(m, yβ.g
S′′ .gS(1+t
′
) mod P
t
′
= t
′′
Chapter 5
Result
5.1 Implementation result
Comparison of two scheme on the basis of computational time and the signature
length. The proposed scheme can be made more efficient than the existing scheme
if we compromise with the security feature, but in our scheme the main focus is
on security of the Blind Signature. The comparison of the schemes is given in the
table below Tables .
5.1.1 Comparison by Computational overhead
Comparison of the two schemes (existing [2.4] and proposed [4]) on the basis of
computational time. The proposed scheme [Chapter 4] can be made more efficient
than the existing scheme [Chapter 2.4] if we compromise with the security feature,
but in our scheme the main focus is on security of the BS. The comparison of the
computational time is given below in Table 5.1. The output is shown by Figure
5.1, 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: Existing Scheme
Phases Existing scheme Proposed Scheme
Blinding 75.933 ms 1.802 ms
Signing 0.482 ms 0.007 ms
Un-blinding 0.080 ms 0.731 ms
Verification 0.061 ms 0.065 ms
Total computational time 76.557 ms 2.606 ms
Table 5.1: Comparison of Computational Overhead
Phase Signature Length
Existing 8 bytes
Proposed 6 bytes
Table 5.2: Comparison of Signature Length
5.1.2 Comparison by Signature Length
Comparison of the two schemes (existing [2.4] and proposed [4]) on the basis of
signature length is shoen by Figure 5.1, 5.2. Comparison of signature length is
given below in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Proposed Scheme
5.2 Security Analysis
The proposed Blind signature scheme is based upon the security of solving hard
computation assumption such as DLP and IFP. It is not possible to attack at this
scheme to obtain private keys. The proposed scheme use complex function in order
to obtain high security. Analysis of security features is done and found that it is
resistant against forgery attack such as existential and selective forgery. Proposed
blind signature scheme claims to be more secure than existing scheme. It is reliable
for confidential transaction, e-commerce, e-cash, e-voting, communication etc.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The proposed BS scheme is based upon the hard computation assumption such as
DLP and IFP [Chapter 4]. The proposed scheme is implemented in Java. It is also
analysed and verified successfully [Chapter 5]. Proposed scheme is compared with
the existing scheme [ see Table 5.1,5.2] and found that the computation overhead
and signature length is lesser for proposed scheme than the existing scheme.The
proposed scheme can have wide range of application in areas such as e-cash, e-
voting, e-commerce [Chapter 3]. It ensures to be more secure than existing scheme.
The proposed scheme ensure, verifiability, non-repudiation, identifiability [2, 3, 4].
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